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ABSTRACT
The Department of Defense (DoD) Space Test Program (STP) is charged with providing access to space for
experiments on the DoD Space Experiments Review Board (SERB) list. Additionally, STP is the “front door” for all
non-DoD Auxiliary Payloads seeking launch opportunities on DoD missions. In this capacity STP manages the launch
integration of a wide variety of missions, including not only DoD satellites, but also satellites built, owned, and
operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), civilian universities, commercial entities,
and foreign governments. Often a single launch mission has multiple satellites from multiple organizations, and may
also contain payloads from one organization hosted on satellites owned by another.
As the launch integration manager for all of these satellites and hosted payloads, STP is faced with the challenging
task of understanding the space policy requirements for a diverse set of agencies, and guiding its mission partners
through the approval process. As small satellites and rideshares lower the barriers to space access, we see increasing
numbers of mission managers who are unsure of what policies are applicable to their missions, and the steps they must
take to demonstrate compliance. In addition, many of STP’s missions fall into policy “grey areas,” where policy and
approval processes are not yet well-defined. In particular, the policy implications of imaging capability, frequency
coordination, cybersecurity, proximity operations, and space debris mitigation are complex, poorly understood, and
constantly evolving. Furthermore, the policy compliance and approval process is always one of the biggest “longlead items” on any satellite’s schedule, and is particularly challenging for small satellites with short build cycles and
limited staff.
This paper explores United States space policies and how they apply to satellite missions that may not fit the typical
satellite mission mold. The paper presents a “roadmap” for policy compliance for satellites from diverse agencies,
and identifies areas where further work is underway to address the challenges posed by the evolution of the space
industry. The paper and presentation lay out a coherent way forward for all small satellites navigating the approval
quagmire, and for mission managers of multi-payload rideshares who wish to smooth the path to launch approval.
satellites has led not only to large numbers of new
entrants into the space business, but also to an increasing
number of rideshares, and the paradigm of a single
launch carrying a single mission to space is no longer the
norm.

INTRODUCTION
In the early days of satellite development and launch,
only governments or government contractors built
satellites and rockets, and generally each launch carried
only a single satellite to orbit. Today, the space
enterprise encompasses many players, including not only
governments and large corporations, but also small
businesses, universities, and even high schools and
affinity organizations. The proliferation of small
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The Department of Defense (DoD) Space Test Program
(STP) has faced this reality for many years. Charged
with providing access to space for experiments on the
DoD Space Experiments Review Board (SERB) list,
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STP is also is the “front door” for all non-DoD Auxiliary
Payloads seeking launch opportunities on DoD missions.
In this role, STP frequently manages rideshares of
diverse satellites from multiple agencies, including not
only DoD satellites, but also satellites built, owned, and
operated by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
(NASA),
civilian
universities,
commercial entities, and foreign governments.1

launched” as well as the country that procured the
launch, this liability is only absolute for damages on
Earth and to aircraft in flight. For damages in space, the
launching country shall be liable “only if damage is due
to its fault of the fault of persons for whom it is
responsible” – in other words, only if the damage is due
to the launching country’s negligence or malicious
intent.

As the launch integration manager for such missions,
STP is faced with the challenging task of understanding
the space policy requirements for a diverse set of
agencies, and guiding its mission partners through the
approval process. STP has worked with the staff of the
office of the Principal DoD Space Advisor Staff,
(PDSAS, formerly SAF/SP), SAF/AQR (Air Force
Acquisitions, Space Programs), the Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL), as well as NASA and other civilian
agencies, to clarify policy applicability, and identify
where policy “boundaries” exist. In this paper, we
explore United States (US) space policies and how they
apply to satellite missions that may not fit the typical
satellite mission mold, on launch missions that may not
have a single responsible agency. Where applicable, we
have outlined the processes and approvals involved in
getting to space. In addition, we have identified where
further work is required to fill in policy gaps and “gray
areas” in the overall policy picture.

Within the US, National Space Policy (NSP)3 also
directs safe and responsible operations in space. Specific
sections discuss protection of the space environment
(including debris mitigation) and protection of the
electromagnetic spectrum. The NSP also references “the
critical interdependence of space and information
systems,” which will flow into lower-level guidance on
cryptographic protection of space systems. Similarly, the
National Space Transportation Policy4 outlines the
authorities for military, civil, and commercial launch
oversight. Military oversight is provided by the DoD;
civil oversight is provided by NASA. Commercial space
transportation oversight is under the Secretary of
Transportation; thus, commercial launches are licensed
by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
The Responsibilities of the Launch Provider vs.
Satellite Owner
The National Space Transportation Policy, true to its
name, discusses mainly access to space in the form of
launches, rather than operations in space once satellites
have separated from the launch vehicle. Similarly, most
lower-level policy demarcates the responsibilities of the
launch provider and the responsibility of the spacecraft
owner / operator at the point where the spacecraft
separates from the launch vehicle or its upper stage.

Like the space industry itself, policy is constantly
evolving. While we have tried to capture the current
“policy roadmap” as accurately as possible, we welcome
corrections and updates from the community as the
picture comes into better focus.
POLICY OVERVIEW
International Treaties and US National Policy

In other words, the launching agency is not (and should
not be) the policy gatekeeper for the satellites it
launches; it cannot be, because once launched, these
satellites are no longer necessarily under the authority or
direction of the launching agency. Without the ability or
authority to enforce policy throughout the satellite’s
orbital lifetime, the launching agency cannot ensure
compliance. Instead, compliance must be enforced
through the parent agency of the satellite owner /
operator. Thus, a NASA satellite launched on a DoD
rocket must demonstrate compliance with NASA policy,
not DoD policy. Similarly a DoD satellite on a
commercial launch must still demonstrate compliance
with DoD policy, not commercial policy. Figure 1
illustrates the general responsibilities of mission partners
on a launch mission, and Figure 2 illustrates in more
detail how these policy responsibilities break down for a
sample multi-payload mission.

2

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 forms the basis of
international space law, and stipulates that states “shall
be responsible for national space activities whether
carried out by governmental or non-governmental
agencies.” It places the responsibility for operations in
space on the government of the nations that fly in space,
and requires “authorization and continuing supervision”
by that government. In the Outer Space Treaty, a nation
“on whose registry an object launched into outer space is
carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such
object….” This implies that the US government has
responsibility over US-owned objects in space,
regardless of whether that object is launched by the US
or by a foreign launch provider. Similarly, foreign
satellites remain the property of foreign entities, even if
launched from a US rocket. While the Outer Space
Treaty places joint liability for damage on the country
“from whose territory or facility a space object is
Braun

2

30th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

Orbital Safety of Space
Vehicles:
Space Vehicle Owners

Launch Safety through Spacecraft Separation:
Launch Vehicle Owner
Launch Certification / Licensing:
Based on Type of Launch and
Launch Vehicle Owner

Reentry / Disposal Safety of
Space Vehicle:
Space Vehicle Owner

Orbital Safety of Launch Vehicle Components:
Launch Vehicle Owner
Range Safety:
Launching Range

Reentry / Disposal Safety of Launch Vehicle
Components:
Launch Vehicle Owner

Figure 1: Policy Compliance and Safety Responsibilities for Launch Missions
In developing multi-payload missions, STP has found
clarifying this demarcation increasingly important to
establishing
the
proper
policy
compliance
responsibilities for its satellite provider partners. Note
that this approach does not preclude the launching
agency from imposing its own more stringent
requirements, or even its own parent agency’s policies,
on the satellites it launches. The launching agency may
still “refuse service” to a satellite that does not meet
certain requirements, even if those stipulations are not
required by policy.
Commercial Launch Vehicle
procured by Rideshare Integrator
follows commercial launch policy

Foreign
Secondary
Payload
follows foreign
country policy

DoD Hosted
Payload
follows DoD
hosted payload
policy

NASA
Secondary
Payload
follows NASA
policy

What Constitutes Ownership?
Determining the parent agency of the satellite is,
therefore, critical to understanding the applicability of
US space policy. The flowchart shown in Figure 3,
developed in partnership with AFRL, illustrates STP’s
method for determining satellite ownership. The key
consideration is, “who will have control authority over
the satellite (or payload) once it launches?” If the DoD
makes the decisions for all spacecraft activities after
launch (commonly referred to as Satellite Control
Authority, or SCA), then it is a DoD satellite, regardless
of whether or not it is built, or operated, by a private
company. Similar rules apply to NASA satellites, with
the additional stipulation that NASA contracts and
NASA grant recipients are also considered NASA
satellites.

Commercial
Primary
Payload
follows
commercial
policy

CubeSat
Launcher

STP frequently arranges for the launch of private
university satellites sponsored to the DoD SERB by
military sponsoring agencies. Some of these satellites are
part of Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR)
/ AFRL University Nanosatellite Program (UNP) a
Science Technology Engineering and Math program.
Although sponsored by UNP, ownership of the vehicle
and SCA remain with the universities. The universities
are private entities, and therefore such payloads currently
follow a commercial path to comply with policy
regulations, not a DoD path. Discussion continues on this
point, however, and this remains an area where further
policy clarity is needed.

containing multiple
CubeSats from
multiple agencies;
each CubeSat
follows policy
applicable to
owning agency

NASA
Secondary
Payloads
follow NASA policy

DoD
Secondary
Payloads
follow DoD policy

Also needed are discussions about “special cases,” such
as civil government satellites that are non-DoD, nonNASA satellites. Later sections will also discuss the

Figure 2: Rideshare Policy Compliance for
Individual Payloads
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Figure 3: Flowchart for Determining Space Vehicle Ownership
special case of DoD satellites that are not National
Security Space (NSS) satellites, as these highlight other
policy gray areas that require further clarification.

Commission (FCC) all have broad policy directives that
flow down from the NSP; these will be discussed in more
detail in the applicable sections of this paper. In
particular, we will discuss orbital debris mitigation
policy, frequency allocation and spectrum usage,
information assurance, imaging, and rendezvous and
proximity operations.

Once the owning organization is identified, the
appropriate policies can also be identified. The DoD,
NASA, the FAA, and the Federal Communications
Braun
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Military Department-level space-related policies and
programs that support … this Directive.” Department of
Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3100.12, Space Support,9
requires that DoD missions comply with debris
mitigation practices that echo the ODMSP. The Air
Force has implemented DoDD 3100.10 and DoDI
3100.12 in Air Force Instructions 91-202, The Air Force
Mishap Prevention Program,10 and 91-217, Space Safety
and Mishap Prevention Program.11 AFI 91-217 is very
similar to the NASA Process for Limiting Orbital Debris.
The Air Force documents compliance in a Space Debris
Assessment Report (SDAR) for launch vehicles, and a
combined SDAR/End of Life Plan (EOLP) for space
vehicles, but the format of these documents are
essentially the same as the NASA ODAR / EOMP. The
other DoD services have implemented the requirements
in DoDD 3100.10 in different ways; the National
Reconnaissance Office has an Office of Debris
Mitigation, while the Army and the Navy have relatively
informal coordination processes.

ORBITAL DEBRIS POLICY
National Policy
As described above, the US NSP calls for protection of
the space environment from orbital debris. Specifically,
one of the Intersector Guidelines directs compliance
with US Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices
(ODMSP), and requires “the head of the sponsoring
department or agency” for space missions to approve
exceptions. The ODMSP itself has four sections,
governing debris generation, accidental explosion,
minimizing the risk of collision with other objects, and
disposal of space objects at the end of mission life.
Tether systems have special considerations in the
ODMSP.
The ODMSP is the source of most of the debris
requirements familiar to experienced satellite
developers: the requirement for disposal within 25 years
of the end of the mission, the requirement that reentering space objects not cause casualties on the earth,
and the requirements that limits the potential for in-space
collision, debris generation, and accidental explosion.
Because these guidelines are national, they apply to all
US missions, but other than the 25-year disposal number
and the 1 in 10,000 “expectation of casualty” number,
the ODMSP does not contain specific numeric
thresholds.

FCC Policy
Private satellites, defined in this case as any satellite not
owned or operated by NASA, NOAA, or the DoD, do
not fall under any of the NASA and DoD policies, but
must still comply with national orbital debris mitigation
guidelines. This compliance is enforced by the only
agency that currently has the authority to regulate
privately-owned US satellites in space: the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), through its
licensing of uplink and downlink frequencies. Title 47 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)12 requires
applicants for frequency licenses to provide information
on their orbits and their plans for orbital debris
mitigation. FCC regulations also require the use of
disposal options and the safing of pressure vessels at the
end of life. An examination of online documents shows
that many private satellites, when applying to the FCC,
use NASA’s ODAR format to document their orbital
debris mitigation compliance. 13, 14, 15

NASA Policy
NASA documents orbital debris mitigation requirements
in NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital
Debris,5and NASA Process for Limiting Orbital Debris.6
In this last document we find specific numeric limits to
the probability of in-space collision (1 in 1000 over the
lifetime of the mission), and accidental explosion (also 1
in 1000). The document lists other detailed requirements
for compliance with the ODMSP. It also requires
documentation of compliance in an Orbital Debris
Assessment Report (ODAR), and an End of Mission
Plan (EOMP). The ODAR and the EOMP are approved
through NASA channels, and exceptions flow up
through the NASA Office of Safety and Mission
Assurance. It is worth noting that the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) satellites also
follow NASA debris mitigation requirements.7

FAA Policy
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) licenses
launch and reentry operations for non-government
launches from US soil, or conducted by US companies
or citizens. Contrary to popular belief, it does not oversee
or regulate satellites in space. FAA regulations levy
safety requirements on launch vehicles, including
limiting the potential for debris generation and
accidental explosions, and for reentry vehicles, limiting
the potential for human casualty on the ground. The
FAA, however, does not regulate the disposal of orbiting
upper stages.16

DoD Policy
Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3100.10,
Space Policy,8 states that the “DoD will promote the
responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space, including
following the U.S. Government Orbital Debris
Mitigation Standard Practices.” In addition, Enclosure 2
of DoDD 3100.10 states that “the Secretaries of the
Military Departments shall formulate and implement
Braun
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Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal
Radio Frequency Management.17

Policy Compliance Process
Once the owning / operating agency for a satellite is
known (see Figure 3), that agency must demonstrate
compliance with its parent agency’s orbital debris
mitigation policy. For NASA, this involves the
preparation and submittal of an SDAR and EOMP in
accordance with the NASA Process for Limiting Orbital
Debris. The process is similar for Air Force missions,
which complete an ODAR/EOLP in accordance with
AFI 91-217. Missions without defined processes or
formats for debris compliance should consider using the
NASA ODAR as the template for demonstrating
compliance with higher policy, as seems to be the
practice for private satellites when requesting licenses
from the FCC. Launch vehicles should follow the FAA’s
process through the “end of launch,” defined by the FAA
as the last exercise of control over the launch vehicle. It
is important to note that exceptions to ODMSP
guidelines require approval at very high levels: the head
of the sponsoring department or agency. Such waivers
are increasingly difficult and time-consuming to get,
suggesting that satellite missions should conduct the
required analyses early in order to allow time for design
changes or waiver approvals, as needed.

The FCC licenses frequency use for non-federal
agencies, including private and commercial satellites.
The FCC documents their rules and regulations in Title
47 of the CFR. Part 25 contains information about
commercial
and
remote
sensing
satellite
communications, Part 5 covers experimental missions,
and Part 97 covers amateur communications.18
Additionally, the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) is the United Nations (UN) Specialized
Agency responsible for telecommunications. The ITU
does not have any authority to enforce policy, but the
participating UN countries honor its treaty status. The
ITU has its own rules and regulations codified in Radio
Regulations.19
Policy Compliance Process
The NTIA is located within the Department of
Commerce (DoC) and is the agency responsible for
managing the federal use of spectrum. Instructions for
filing are laid out in the Manual of Regulations and
Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management.
The NTIA grants the authority to use a frequency, not a
license. The Frequency Assignment Subcommittee
(FAS), within the NTIA, coordinates and assigns radio
frequencies. NASA programs work their submission
through the individual center spectrum management
office and then the NASA spectrum management office.
The NASA spectrum management office will then
submit paperwork to the NTIA. DoD-owned missions
submit through service-level spectrum management
offices, who then submit to the NTIA. There are four
filing stages for federal programs: 1 – Conceptual, 2 –
Experimental, 3 – Developmental and 4 – Operational;
each is explained in detail in section 10.4.1 of the NTIA
manual17. Most small satellites performing science and
technology (S&T) or research and development (R&D)
missions will obtain a Stage 2 Experimental license. As
the name indicates, operational satellites will obtain a
Stage 4 Operational license. Unlike the FCC there is no
requirement to conduct debris or lifetime analysis when
applying to the NTIA for frequency usage.

Ambiguity, Open Questions and Recommendations
The ODMSP guidelines represent one of the more wellknown and universally accepted aspects of space policy,
but policy gaps still exist. One of the biggest open
questions is whether the FCC, whose mission typically
has little to do with space, should be the agency to
enforce orbital debris mitigation policy on the
burgeoning commercial and private satellite business.
Similarly, the lack of specific requirements for orbiting
upper stages for non-DoD or NASA launches is a gap
that policymakers must ultimately address. Also, it is
important to note that although the orbital debris
compliance requirement is 25 years after mission
completition, all satellite owners should strive to dispose
of the vehicle once the mission is concluded, as good
stewards of space. Finally, many organizations lack
specific policy guidance outlining the document format
and approval authorities for orbital debris compliance.
This can lead to confusion and ad-hoc approaches to
compliance, in an area where clarity is badly needed.

The FCC is an independent US government agency
(overseen by Congress) that regulates interstate and
international communications by radio, television, wire,
satellite, and cable in the US. Part 25 of CFR 4712
outlines the application and filing process. Most small
satellites will submit for either an amateur or an
experimental frequency. The main difference is that
amateur frequencies are for communications only, and
the operator cannot have a financial interest on behalf of

SPECTRUM USAGE
Summary of Applicable Policy
Public law and regulations, rather than policy, provide
all guidance for the assignment and usage of spectrum
for satellites. The National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) regulates frequency
usage for federal agencies such as NASA and the DoD.
The NTIA documents their rules and procedures in the
Braun
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an employer. Experimental frequencies, are, logically,
for conducting experiments.

Additionally, there is often confusion for programs that
fall into “gray areas.” For example, a university-owned
and operated satellite that receives funding from the DoD
and launches on a DoD launch vehicle remains a private
satellite, but is sometimes directed to the NTIA for
frequency approval. Occasionally, missions get different
answers from the FCC and the NTIA. The future will
probably bring more of these “gray area” missions, and
it would be helpful to have a single office for frequency
submittals. That office could then route the approvals to
either the NTIA or the FCC, as appropriate to each
mission.

To use amateur frequencies, missions do not apply for a
license for the satellite, but as a licensed amateur
operator, you must submit a pre-launch notification.
Missions can submit an amateur filing by mail or by
email. Additionally, for any use of amateur frequencies,
missions must coordinate with the International Amateur
Radio Union (IARU) and include that information with
the package to the FCC. For an experimental license
the FCC requires that missions file electronically
through their online tool. In both instances the FCC
suggests that missions file no later than 30 days after
your launch has been identified.

CYBERSECURITY/INFORMATION
ASSURANCE

Missions filing with the FCC must demonstrate
compliance with the ODMSP guildelines, as described
in the orbital debris section of this paper. Missions must
show that they are not going to be a source of debris, that
they will not cause debris, that they will deorbit within
25 years of end of life, and that they will not have an
expectation of casualty other than zero when re-entering.
If missions cannot demonstrate this satisfactorily to the
FCC, they may be required to carry insurance or risk not
be approved to broadcast.

Summary of Applicable Policy
Cybersecurity policy for small spacecraft is defined in a
complex and confusing menagerie of policy documents
published by the DoD, the Committee on National
Security Systems (CNSS), the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), and other
organizations. For all spacecraft used by the DoD, a key
document is DoDI 8581.01, Information Assurance (IA)
Policy for Space Systems Used by the Department of
Defense.20 This instruction implements CNSS Policy
No. 12, National Information Assurance Policy for
Space Systems Used to Support National Security
Missions.21 To determine if an information system is
considered NSS, there is NIST SP 800-59, Guideline for
Identifying an Information System as a National Security
System.22

When frequency usage is approved, the FCC and NTIA
submit their frequency assignments to an FCC Liaison
who then submits the US assignments to the ITU who
maintains the international register. Getting a license or
approval to use a frequency through either agency takes
months to years, so missions should start working on the
application and submittal as soon as possible.

There are two DoD Instructions governing cybersecurity
compliance for all DoD information systems (not just
space systems).
They are DoDI 8500.01,
Cybersecurity,23 and the Risk Management Framework
(RMF) for DoD Information Technology (IT), 2014.24
These two instructions align the DoD with the rest of the
federal government by adopting common CNSS and
NIST controls, particularly NIST Special Publication
800-53, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal
Information Systems and Organizations.25
This
promotes interoperability, information sharing, and
reciprocity, enabling organizations to accept approvals
by other organizations for interconnection or reuse of IT
without retesting. The RMF replaces the old DoD
Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation
Process (DIACAP), and a transition from DIACAP to
RMF is underway.

Ambiguity, Open Questions and Recommendations
There is strict protection of the amateur frequencies from
use by experimental or federal programs. This has led to
some confusion in the community as to the ability to use
amateur bands, particularly since until recently,
experimental or federally-connected programs regularly
used amateur bands. Programs who have previously
used amateur bands are now having to figure out if they
have to go through the FCC for an experimental
frequency, or through the NTIA. For example, satellites
being built and sponsored by the US Naval Academy
have in the past used amateur frequencies, and operate
an amateur ground station at the Academy. As a federal
agency, however, it now appears they should file through
the NTIA, and will no longer be allowed to file through
the FCC to use amateur frequencies. As of the writing
of this paper the matter has not been resolved, and the
resolution has been hampered, in part, by the lack of
clear communication between the FCC and the NTIA.

Braun

Policy Compliance Process
There are two primary areas of compliance associated
with spacecraft cybersecurity policy (although this is not
exhaustive). The first concerns protection of the
spacecraft uplink and downlink (i.e. the requirement for
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encryption). The second concerns certification and
accreditation (C&A) requirements of the spacecraft as an
information system (i.e. the requirement to receive an
Authority to Operate, or ATO). These will be covered
in turn.

NASA was required to issue an ATO to the spacecraft
because it will be operated on an accredited DoD ground
system.
Commercial and private spacecraft have no requirements
to undertake a formal cybersecurity accreditation. When
the DoD is using non-DoD systems, DoDI 8581.01
requires that the AO for the DoD organization using the
system perform a review of the space system’s ability to
meet cybersecurity requirements and accept the risk for
any non-compliances.

Encryption
For DoD-owned or controlled spacecraft, DoDI 8581.01
requires encryption of the uplink and downlink. This
applies to all DoD satellites, including R&D spacecraft
built by DoD laboratories or academic institutions.
Selection and implementation of the cryptography used
to meet requirements should be coordinated with
National Security Agency (NSA) early in the design
phase of every spacecraft program.

Ambiguity, Open Questions and Recommendations
The first ambiguity has to do with whether a spacecraft
should be considered “DoD” and therefore subject to
DoD cybersecurity policy. There have been differing
interpretations received, with the most stringent
classifying any spacecraft receiving DoD sponsorship or
funding of any nature as DoD and subject to all DoD
policy requirements. This interpretation would have far
reaching implications and is not considered tenable. As
described in the section on satellite ownership, satellites
should be classified unambiguously based on who is the
owner/operator of the spacecraft. Cybersecurity policy
compliance should be based on the requirements of the
owner/operator organization.

For non-DoD Federal spacecraft (i.e. NASA), encryption
is not strictly required. However NIST SP 800-53 does
apply, and the criticality and sensitivity of information
transmitted may lead to selection of security controls that
include encryption. Organizational policies may also
apply, for example NASA Procedural Requirements
2810.1A, Security of Information Technology,26 defines
information technology security requirements for
NASA.
For commercial or private spacecraft, encryption is not
typically required. However if the DoD is using a
commercial/private, non-DoD Federal, or foreign space
system, DoDI 8581.01 has requirements pertaining to
encryption. Depending on the criticality and sensitivity
of the DoD information being transmitted, uplink and/or
downlink cryptography may be required ranging from
NSA-approved to commercial best practices. In order to
obtain a NOAA commercial remote sensing license,
there are rigorous conditions to incorporate safeguards to
ensure the integrity of system operations and security of
its data. Early coordination with NSA is recommended.

A second ambiguity has to do with whether a satellite
system is considered NSS. NIST SP 800-59 has a
checklist with six questions to determine if an
information system is NSS. Based on this checklist,
many DoD R&D spacecraft developed and operated by
military laboratories and academic institutions are not
NSS. As such, CNSSP No. 12 is not applicable.
However DoDI 8581.01 (which implements CNSSP No.
12) does not provide any provisions for non-NSS DoD
spacecraft, which drives costly compliance requirements
on these programs out of proportion to overall program
cost and risk. DoDI 8581.01 should be revised to either
explicitly exclude non-NSS DoD spacecraft or to
provide streamlined compliance procedures for this class
of spacecraft.

Certification & Accreditation (C&A)
DoDI 8581.01 requires that all DoD owned systems
undergo cybersecurity accreditation in accordance with
RMF. A full discussion of the RMF process is beyond
the scope of this paper. However two points are worth
mentioning. Each DoD spacecraft program should
determine who their cybersecurity Authorizing Official
(AO) is early in the program. The AO staff should be an
invaluable resource, and the AO will ultimately issue the
ATO for the spacecraft.

DoD 8581.01 provides procedures for implementing
cybersecurity when DoD uses non-DoD spacecraft.
“Use” is not well-defined and subject to interpretation.
It would be beneficial to expand this section of the policy
to include different cases of “use”, such as hosted
payloads, commercial imagery, and DoD sponsorship.
Additionally, as hosting DoD payloads on non-DoD
spacecraft becomes more common, cybersecurity
requirements and responsibilities need to be better
defined in memoranda of agreement up front.

Non-DoD Federal spacecraft must follow their own
internal policies regarding accreditation.
Recent
experiences with NASA indicate that formal C&A
accreditation of the spacecraft (like a DoD ATO) is
typically not required. For the GPIM mission on STP-2,
Braun
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non-DoD spacecraft command and control capability
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(particularly uplink encryption) when the spacecraft
possesses significant delta-V capabilities. This is a
significant policy hole that will become more
pronounced with the increasing capabilities of small
satellites and CubeSats; policy should be established
requiring uplink security on all spacecraft with
significant delta-V capability.
This could be
incorporated into the established process for securing an
FCC frequency license. Federal organizations entering
into agreements with foreign spacecraft should establish
this requirement, particularly when the U.S. is providing
launch services for the foreign spacecraft.

Policy Compliance Process
The compliance process for commercial and civilian
entities is outlined on the NOAA Commercial Remote
Sensing Regulatory Affairs (CRSRA) website. NOAA
recommends beginning the process with informal, nonbinding meetings between the applicant and NOAA to
help inform the process and prevent rework. When an
organization is prepared to begin the application process,
Code of Federal Regulations Title 15 Part 960 29
establishes the rules and procedures to be followed and
NOAA provides support to ensure all the required
documentation is provided. Part 960 consists of four
subparts and two appendices which lay out the
application process and filing instructions, the terms and
conditions of a granted license, the appeals process,
prohibitions associated with licensing, the enforcement
procedures for licensees and non-licensees, and the
requirements levied on NOAA through the DoC
regarding the stakes of other government parties with
respect to imaging licenses. All license determinations
are required to be made within 120 days of receipt of a
completed application unless written guidance is
provided on issues that exist with the application. All
licenses are valid for the operational lifetime of the
system unless voided through action of the owner or
operator.

IMAGING
Summary of Applicable Policy
Remote sensing from a space platform falls into two
distinct regulatory categories in the US, Earth Imaging
and non-Earth Imaging (NEI). There are also two types
of satellites considered, with one subtype. The two
primary types are commercial (civilian) satellites and
satellites owned and operated by the government. This
second type has a subset of DoD academic institutions
which fall into their own unique policy bucket. This
section will explore the various policies that apply to
each type of satellite in each regulatory category and
provide a basic understanding of how to navigate the
policy compliance process.

Ambiguity, Open Questions and Recommendations

Satellites owned and operated by commercial entities
and civilian academic institutions are governed by the
National Commercial and Space Programs Act.27 This
law governs Earth imaging and assigns authority to
NOAA for licensing of the same. For these commercial
and civilian academic institutions, NOAA will ensure all
imagers also comply with DoD and Intelligence
Community (IC) requirements for NEI.

The DoD and Federal Government are in the process of
providing clearer policy guidance for military academic
institutions and satellites that are part of UNP. Until this
definition is provided in final guidance those
organizations should continue working through STP and
UNP to obtain appropriate guidance.

In researching this section, the team was unable to
identify any NASA guidance or documentation with
respect to imaging approval. All imaging devices aboard
NASA satellites and missions are handled internal to the
Administration. Government agencies currently have no
requirement to obtain licensing for Earth imaging. NEI
for operational DoD systems is managed by the Defense
Remote Sensing Working Group (DRSWG).
Experimental DoD satellites are governed by interim
guidance issued by the PDSAS.28 This interim guidance,
issued in 2015, requires DoD experimental satellites
with remote sensing capability to submit test plans, data
protection plans, and technical specifications of their
system and payloads to the PDSAS, through the
Secretary of the Air Force Space Programs (SAF/AQS)
office. If PDSAS determines a concern exist with
respect to an experimental DoD satellite the issue is
automatically referred to the DRSWG.

Summary of Applicable Policy

Braun

RENDEZVOUS AND PROXIMITY OPERATIONS

Current proximity operations policy is a patchwork set
of policy and guidance across the space community. As
the capability of small satellite systems increases, the
desire for missions to perform proximity operations
becomes more of a reality. Spacecraft designers must
balance the need to perform mission objectives with
safety of flight concerns. Although not necessarily
proximity operation, safety of flight concerns extend to
formation flying missions which intend to maintain a
constant relative distance to each other. NASA currently
has no policy guidance concerning proximity operations.
There is a policy in the DoD for the review of proximity
operations missions, but this policy may not be widely
available. Neither the FCC nor the FAA has any policy
compliance requirements for on-orbit proximity
operations.
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would apply to the NTIA for frequency assignment. If
the satellite will perform proximity operations, DoD
proximity operations regulations must be followed.

Policy Compliance Process
DoD missions intending to perform proximity operations
missions must comply with DoD processes. Civil and
commercial entities are currently not required to comply
with any process unique to proximity operations
objectives, although missions will naturally need to
comply with all frequency and imaging requirements
discussed above.

As another example, assume a private company builds a
commercial satellite capable of imaging and conducting
stationkeeping, and brings it to the DoD SERB for
consideration. Even with SERB sponsorship, the satellite
is still considered a commercial / private satellite, and
will follow public policy for privately-owned satellites.
It will apply for a frequency license through the FCC,
and apply to NOAA for imaging approval. As part of its
FCC filing, it will demonstrate its compliance with the
ODMSP. However, there is no existing policy requiring
such a satellite to encrypt its uplink or downlink, nor is
it required to get approvals to conduct proximity
operations. These are policy gaps that must be filled.

Ambiguity, Open Questions and Recommendations
With the growth in capability of small satellites there has
been a surge in formation flying and rendezvous,
proximity, and docking missions. Due to the extreme
technical challenges of performing these missions and
the inherent safety of flight concerns, clarification on
processes for civil and commercial entities would be
beneficial. The policy should distinguish between
formation flying and proximity operations based off
relative distance to space vehicles and define policy
guidance for each class. Key to this guidance should be
directives based off the amount of delta-V each space
vehicle intends to carry. This should inform the
cybersecurity posture of the vehicle and ground system.
A related issue that needs to be captured (possibly in this
policy) is cybersecurity requirements for vehicles with
propulsion. Care should be taken to separate policy
requirements for significant translational propulsion
systems from those required for simple attitude control
propulsive systems. It is recommended for both
formation and proximity operations missions that
mission designers comply with NIST SP 800-53 and
implement commercial best practice encryption on the
uplink and downlink.
POLICY
“FLOWCHART”
WALKTHROUGH

AND

CONCLUSION
The policy picture for today’s rapidly-evolving space
enterprise is complex and confusing, particularly to nontraditional entrants and missions that occupy policy
“gray areas.” In this paper, we have attempted to clarify
the applicability of existing policy, and outline a process
for missions to follow to ensure compliance. We have
also attempted to highlight areas where policy is absent
or unclear. STP is in the process of applying this
“roadmap” to its ongoing STP-2 mission, as well as
future missions currently in work. It is, however,
important to remember that the policy roadmap is always
“under construction,” and that future changes are
certainly expected. As the space enterprise evolves we
hope that US policy will be agile enough to evolve with
it, to ensure both access to space for all, and safety in
space for all.

SAMPLE

Figures 3-7 summarize all the policy pathways described
in this paper, to the extent that the authors understand the
existing policy framework. Starting in Figure 3, above,
missions must first determine who “owns” the satellite,
in order to determine what policy applies. Typically, the
ultimate satellite owner / operator – whoever will have
satellite control authority once the satellite is operational
– is the agency whose policy the mission must follow.
Once the mission ownership is understood, the
remaining figures (Figures 3 through 7) describe the
applicable policy.
As an example, if AFRL builds a satellite intending to
conduct unclassified proximity operations, the Air Force
is the owner / operator, and the DoD policy flowchart
should be followed. DoD satellites are required to abide
by information assurance requirements as documented in
DoDI 8581.01; and even if the mission is unclassified,
must use NSA-approved encryption. Such a satellite
Braun

Figure 4: Key to Policy Roadmap Flowcharts
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Figure 5: Policy Roadmap Flowchart for DoD Satellites

Braun
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Figure 6: Policy Roadmap Flowchart for NASA satellites

Braun
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Figure 7: Policy Roadmap Flowchart for Private Satellites
Braun
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“NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting
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“Department of Defense Instruction 8581.01:
Information Assurance Policy for Space
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21.
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for Space Systems Used to Support National
Security Missions”, November 28, 2012,
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